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## INTELLIGENCE REPORT

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1. COMMUNIST CHINA

There has been no indication so far that the developments which have produced major changes in the domestic Chinese power structure have affected the main lines of Peking's foreign policy. Chinese actions reflect no marked change in either tactics or strategy abroad. On the two key issues--the war in Vietnam and the struggle with the Soviet Union--there has been no movement away from long-established positions.

With regard to Vietnam, the Chinese continue their efforts to keep the Vietnamese Communists steadfast in the conflict. As before, they are supplying Hanoi with war materials and economic assistance. A new aid agreement was signed on 29 August. The Chinese military presence in North Vietnam--mainly construction troops and logistic units--has not grown since the first of the year. Peking's marked caution on the question of direct Chinese intervention remains unchanged.

Relations with Moscow, long close to a state of "cold war," are if anything somewhat worse. Chinese abuse of the Soviets has reached new heights, and the Soviet leaders are being castigated as "number one accomplices of the US." The Chinese, however, do not appear inclined to push matters to a formal break in relations.

The Chinese have been marking time in foreign policy since the end of 1965, about the time the power struggle got under way in Peking. Since then the leaders have become increasingly preoccupied with events close to home. This situation seems likely to continue for some time--until there is a final resolution to the problem of who is to rule China. However, this struggle could yet result in new departures that would shift the entire course of Chinese foreign policy.

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### 3. COLOMBIA

President Carlos Lleras Restrepo, who has been in office less than a month, is faced with developing opposition in several important areas.

Lleras began his administration in favorable circumstances: rural banditry had largely been brought under control, the political situation was generally stable, and economic conditions had improved during the preceding year. Serious political and economic problems remained, however.

Lleras has taken up his job with great vigor. On 23 August he asked Congress to permit the passage of laws by simple majority and to grant him power to revamp the public administration. This proposal met stiff opposition, however, and aroused the ire of many congressmen who accused him of seeking monarchical powers. At a time when leftist student leaders were trying to organize a nationwide strike, Lleras gave them additional cause by issuing a decree penalizing students for missing classes because of strikes. He has also irritated the bureaucracy by announcing that about 20,000 superfluous officeholders in the government would be removed.

In addition to these problems on which Lleras has taken the initiative, he faces the possibility of resurgent Communist guerrilla warfare. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] the Communist Party of Colombia is attempting to organize a large-scale guerrilla effort, which may be combined with urban terrorism and increased subversion among student and labor groups.

If Lleras handles these problems successfully, he will create a climate more favorable for implementing his long-range economic program. However, a defeat early in his term would damage his prestige and weaken the public's confidence in him.

[REDACTED]

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